Libertarianism is a radical, extremist, absolutist philosophy.

It's about right and wrong. Plain and simple.

Undoubtedly, others disagree. They refuse to join us radical miscreants in upholding the Non-Aggression Principle as the sole nexus of determining right and wrong in human affairs.

The Non-Aggression Principle, or NAP for short, states that the initiation of coercive violence against another person's property (including his or her body) is morally abhorrent. In short, the NAP says that involuntary, coercive violence is wrong. This is why murder, taxation (public theft), and burglary (private theft) -- among other instances of initiatory violence -- are all flat wrong.

What the NAP does not do is assign grades. Murder of one person is neither more, nor less wrong, than the murder of another person. Murder is wrong, period. Taxing 30% of an individual's income does not receive an NAP violation grade of D- while dropping an atom bomb on a Japanese metropolitan region gets an NAP violation grade of F. The civil asset seizure by police of a young man's car does not score on an NAP violation scale at 6, while the same instance of theft-by-police of a young woman's cannabis plants scores at 5.5.

You get the point.

The problem is that comparing particular instances of NAP violations inevitably requires leaping over a logically insurmountable hurdle. That hurdle is called the problem of interpersonal utility comparison.

An interpersonal utility comparison occurs when one's subjectively felt satisfaction is compared to that of another. A common example goes like this: "My gym selfie looks 15 times better than hers."

Fifteen times what?

Tell 'em Murray:

It is important to realize that there is never any possibility of measuring increases or decreases in happiness or satisfaction. Not only is it impossible to measure satisfaction of different people; it is not possible to measure changes in the happiness of any given person.

Why is that Murray?

In order for any measurement to be possible, there must be an eternally fixed and objectively given unit with which other units may be compared. There is no such objective unit with which other units may be compared. There is no such objective unit in the field of human valuation. The individual must determine subjectively for himself whether he is better or worse off as a result of any change.

Since gym selfies weren't around in Murray's day, he uses a different example to illustrate the same point:

Thus, he can say "I am better off" or "I am happier" because he went to a concert instead instead of playing bridge (or "I will be better off" for going to the concert), but it would be completely meaningless for him to try to assign units to his preference and say, "I am two and a half times happier because of this choice than I would have been playing bridge." Two and a half times what? (emphasis in original)

Ergo, man's utility cannot be scientifically compared, be it between two feelings of utility within himself (as with Murray's concert-goer/bridge-player) or between two feelings of utility, each within two separate people (as with my obnoxious gym selfie photographers). This is the problem of interpersonal utility comparison.

Here I assert that the problem of interpersonal utility comparison has a twin brother (or sister, whatever), that is: interpersonal disutility comparison.

In other words, if it is scientifically impossible to compare one's utility or satisfaction within oneself or against that of others, it is likewise scientifically impossible to compare one's disutility or dissatisfaction within oneself or against that of others. Plainly, what counts for the problem of interpersonal utility comparison also must count for interpersonal disutility comparison.

This must be so, because disutility (dissatisfaction), like utility (satisfaction) is an internal, subjective phenomenon. In Murray's words, "there is no objective unit with which other units may be compared. There is no such objective unit in the field of human valuation." Thus, if you accept the problem of interpersonal utility comparison, which you should, then you must also accept the problem of interpersonal disutility comparison.

Ah, an objection: "But Griggs, are you trying to say that people can't compare two different NAP violations and then pick which is worse? What if the options are the murder of one person, and the murder of fifty? You're saying that as libertarians, we can't pick which is worse?"

(Extreme, I know, but since I dare mingle in ethics, my proposals must hold true in all cases.)

The answer to my hypothetical opponent is: precisely.

Recall the radical, extreme, absolutist nature of libertarianism and the NAP. The murder of one does not score at a 2 on the mythical NAP-violation-scale, while the murder of fifty scores at an 8. The NAP does not assign grades. Coercive violence is wrong, period.

The reason that the murder of one cannot be scientifically compared to the murder of fifty is the problem of interpersonal disutility comparison.

Suppose in my hypothetical opponent's example that the "one" to be murdered is your dearest loved one, and that the fifty others were the top exterminators in the Nazi regime.

This alternate presentation almost sorts itself out on its own. Do you see how by playing on the subjective valuations of you, my dear reader, the analysis has suddenly become less clear? This is what happens when one implicitly disregards the problem of interpersonal disutility comparison.

The key to fully comprehending all this may be the term scientific comparison.

Sure, to a man, one can choose for himself that which satisfies himself, and likewise, that which dissatisfies himself. But to cloak one's subjective valuation in the veil of libertarianism and declare under the science of liberty, that once and for all, as a universally true statement, that event X is more satisfying (or more dissatisfying) than event Y requires a vicious and deceptive category error.

Libertarian (objective) ethics and subjective valuation are distinct categories. To remain true to the libertarian creed, the two must never meet. As in the case of murder of one, compared to murder of fifty, man as libertarian does not grade, rank, or score. He forthwith blasts the two as disgusting NAP violations. Man as his own individual -- preferring this to that, detesting X as worse than Y -- he may come to his own subjective valuation.

For man to ascribe the power of objective, libertarian judgement to his own, subjective valuations is the central error of modern libertarian discourse.

Take immigration for example.

It's become rather posh for libertarians of various subjectively-held stripes to offer "second best solutions" to the issue of immigration, given the fact that we do not live in a fully private property, natural law society without a central state.

One self-published author (a title I assign with utmost respect) writes the following as the first paragraph in a piece entitled "The Libertarian Case AGAINST Open Borders":

Perhaps one of the most hotly debated topics in libertarian circles is that of immigration, and understandably so. The heated disagreements come from debates regarding what immigration polices (sic) most closely align with libertarian principles of justice given a Statist paradigm. Of course no such policies will attain the purity of justice that would result from the absolute privatization of all public goods/services coupled with the elimination of the State. However, the purpose of this essay is to make a case for what the “second-best” solution is. (emphasis added)

Thus, in an article claiming to make a libertarian case, we have before us a pertinent example of the implicit disregard of the problem of interpersonal disutility comparison.

In other words, my libertarian friend has set before himself the task of proposing arrangements that will be less, rather than more, dissatisfactory (whatever the particular proposed arrangements may be) -- dissatisfactory, because of the existence of a state. The problem of interpersonal disutility comparison has been ignored, and what is to follow this first paragraph will take the form of personal value judgments as to what is more or less dissatisfying, erroneously cloaked in the objective certainty of libertarian ethics.

The particular complaints against free immigration, e.g. forced integration and the probability of expansion of the welfare state, are therefore fruit of the poisonous tree. For the libertarian analysis, the particular nature of what motivates some to advocate closed borders, or open borders, or any state-sponsored, state-enforced policies are irrelevant.

To the contrary, the strict libertarian analyst must ask: "Do the various proposals involve NAP violations?"

Insofar as the "closed border" proposal involves state enforcement of state borders, and the NAP violations constituted therein (e.g. the forced exclusion of a voluntarily-invited, or otherwise peaceful immigrant), the libertarian response is: reject it.

Insofar as the "open border" proposal involves state agents forcefully preventing private property owners from excluding potential trespassers from their property, the libertarian response is: reject it.

In fact, the appropriate libertarian admonition when presented with the whole goddamn statist, NAP-violation-riddled, closed-open border binary is: reject it, root and branch, with radically lucid, moral certainty!