![](https://steemitimages.com/DQmP7e7yZYreWaEzpqVJQzPEPEp49AfZu2Zfb7oQcfBikAv/image.png) # 1 Conflict or Convergence Faith and reason. Science and religion. Many people would argue that these terms are incompatible with one another, oxymorons, or that one must endure sever cognitive dissonance to be able to hold to both.¹ It seems most Americans hold this belief citing everything from origins of the universe, the origins of life, evolution, homosexuality, medical practices, prayer, miracles, the afterlife, even global warming as being in conflict with their own religious beliefs.² But are these issues really points of conflict between science and religion, or should we prefer a different model? What does it even mean to be in conflict? Space restrains a full examination of each in turn, but fruitful progress can be made by focusing on an interesting and relevant case, namely the existence of the soul. Before diving into the specifics of the case, a few general points are needed. Conflict – the antagonistic tension many see science and religion in – could itself take a variety of meanings. For example, are the two areas in conflict because they proceed according to different methodologies? Or are they in conflict because they differ in their central claims? Some thinkers conflate the former with the latter, different methodologies lead inexorably to contradictory or incompatible positions.³ The difficulty is that there is no reason to hold that different methodologies lead to incompatible conclusions, in fact, the opposite case is true: if different methodologies arrive at truth, they will *agree*. Consider an example concerning the topic at hand, science and religion. The Abrahamic faiths contend that the universe began to exist at some point in the finite past. This is a claim that comes through revelation, not through scientific methodologies. Modern cosmology – through advances in theoretical physics, experimentation, and new observational techniques – comes to the same conclusion, namely that the universe began to exist at a finite time in the past.⁴ It is true, that there are some Christians who insist upon a given age of the universe which is in disagreement with widely accepted scientific estimates, but we do have agreement on the fact of a beginning, and thus a clear counter-example to notions that different methodologies must lead to incompatible claims. If conflict is not a pre-requisite and it is clear that different disciplines – namely science and religion – do interact, the question becomes: how to best understand and navigate that interaction? Following Garrett DeWeese’s nomenclature, we turn to the *convergence model*.⁵ The convergence model is predicated on both the knowability and consistency of truth. In other words, projects such as science and other areas of human inquiry have the goal of ever more accurate descriptions of the world; they seek truth and do so because it is knowable. Truth is consistent in the same way as the previous example of two separate areas of inquiry came to the same, consistent conclusion about the universe having a beginning. As these various research projects mature, they will converge to a “unified description of reality.”⁶ Not every area of science and religion will interact with one another, but the ones that do, in the long run, come to agree with one another. This allows for various disciplines to correct one another as evidence grows and knowledge deepens. While conflict at any given time is possible, “convergence recognizes the possibility of error on both sides...but conflict then is a matter of interpretation, not some fundamental feature of the two disciplines.”⁷ That is all well and good, but the fact of the matter is that we have yet to reach the long-run point of convergence for all disciplines. So how do we adjudicate the differences and areas of apparent conflict in the meantime, and do so in a way that will bring the eventual harmony? After all, it would be a shame to repress true science with faulty theology and vice-versa. ## 1.1 Development of a Convergence Model Imre Lakatos was a philosopher of science who found a middle-ground between Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn by taking Kuhn’s socio-historical model of science seriously by redefining the term *theory*. Theory, for Lakatos, involves a hard-core surrounded by a “protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses which has to bear the brunt of tests and gets readjusted, or even completely replaced, to defend the thus hardened-core.”⁸ This re-interpretation of Popper’s falsification nuances it and brings it into closer harmony with Kuhn’s view. Rather than periods of “normal science” or radical falsification and jettisoning of complete theories, it is only this group of auxiliary hypotheses that gets modified in a progressive research program. This can be understood by construction of a simple [*modus tollens*](http://changingminds.org/disciplines/argument/syllogisms/modus_tollens.htm) where: 1. If the hard-core plus auxiliary hypotheses, then predicted observation *O*. 2. ¬*O* (failed prediction) 3. ∴ ¬ hard-core plus auxiliary hypotheses⁹ Thus, when ¬*O* rears its ugly head, the research program itself is not threatened, rather the negation is directed at one of the auxiliary hypotheses which is either refined to account for ¬*O* or, ¬*O* is isolated until it can be dealt with at a later time. Either way, the research program carries on as long as it continues to make novel predictions with respect to rival research programs and gains additional empirical evidence. If, however, it continues to fail in making novel predictions and is continuously caught off-guard by various observations, then the research program is regressive and alternatives should be sought. This Lakatosian model is helpful for both science and theology as well as their relation to one another. Revisiting the beginning of the universe example, the age of the earth is could scarcely be said to comprise part of the hard-core of Christian theology. If the earth is 6,000 years old or 4.5 billion years old, then it has absolutely no bearing on whether or not Christ died and rose; whether he carried out a ministry of miracles; whether or not he was God incarnate; nor whether or not God exists. In this sense, the age of the earth comprises an auxiliary hypothesis far removed from the hard-core of the theory which can easily be amended according to the scientific evidence at hand without compromising the hard-core itself.¹⁰ Using this Lakatosian understanding and the example given, we can outline a few guiding principles to help adjudicate areas of overlap and potential conflict between science and religion and apply them to the test cases. DeWeese outlines seven criteria to this end: 1. Given a statement of science *S* and theology *T*, are *S* and *T* contradictory, complimentary, or contrary? 2. Do *S* and *T* violate any control beliefs or axiomatic presuppositions of either research program? 3. How deeply ingressed are *S* and *T* in their respective programs? 4. What is the relative degree of support for *S* and *T*? 5. Are either *S* or *T* subject to significant internal problems? 6. Is an anti-realist interpretation of *S* or *T* possible or desirable? 7. Can either *S* or *T* be isolated for the time being or is a judgement forced?¹¹ These guidelines are useful as they allow clear and systematic thinking about the deliverances of both science and theology (as well as other disciplines), and how they shape one’s world view. Using a Lakatosian model, we also see that one need not entirely abandon a fruitful research project in light of an anomaly as those who adhere to the popular Popperian understanding are want to do. We now turn to application of these criteria in the case of the human soul. # 2 The Soul: An Application of the Convergence Model ## 2.1 Scientific Materialism Many scientists and philosophers of mind take a materialist approach to their approach and deny the existence of an immaterial self or soul. There are a number of lines of evidence and support taken from science that are often cited to support an eliminitivist position whereby the soul is eliminated from one’s ontology and all living creatures are taken to be identical with their physical bodies, in other words, we are our brains and bodies. Arguments in support of this position come from neuroscience and new models that are used to understand the brain and its functionality.¹² Additionally, eliminativists often point to the interaction problem of mind and body, and the fact that one’s personality can be altered by affecting the brain.¹³ ## 2.2 Christian Dualism Christianity has been classically conceived as a dualist religion, positing both a body and a soul created by God.¹⁴ There is ample Biblical evidence for the existence of a soul a brief list would include: Jesus warning about not fearing those who can kill the body but not the soul;¹⁵ Jesus’ resuscitation of little girl was described as “her spirit” returning to her which animated her body;¹⁶ James likening death to the body without the spirit;¹⁷ John describes Jesus as “giving up his spirit” upon his death.¹⁸ The soul/spirit (henceforth simply soul) is believed to be the rational and animating substance for humans. Stewart Goetz characterizes the soul by assigning it a number of essential powers and capacities such as “the power to think about, consider or focus on different issues...and the power to choose or act.”¹⁹ The essential capacities include, “the capacity to experience pleasure...the capacity to experience pain...and the capacity to desire...and to believe.”²⁰ ## 2.3 Application With the general outlines stated above, let us apply DeWeese’s criteria to the following statements: • *S*: Humans are material beings and lack any immaterial substance whatsoever (materialism/eliminativism). • *T*: Humans consist of two substances, a material body and immaterial soul (dualism). ### 2.3.1 Are *S* and *T* contradictory, complimentary, or contrary? *S* and *T*, as stated, are explicitly contradictory, thus, if we are forced to come to a decision on this topic (criteria 7), then at least one must be modified or abandoned. Clearly, the classical Christian teaching of a soul is incompatible with current scientific understanding of human nature. ### 2.3.2 Do *S* and *T* violate any control beliefs or axiomatic presuppositions of either research program? A control belief serves as a foundational belief which supports the research program. For example, the existence of the external, physical world would be a control belief for both science and Christianity. Without this belief in place, scientific empiricism would collapse and the historical claims that are central to Christianity would be meaningless. It would also seem that *S* and *T* are not control beliefs for either discipline. Some dispute may arise at this point from both sides, however the existence of an immaterial soul would not destroy scientific progress for understanding the brain, even if the soul itself may not be studied. Instead, it seems, that greater emphasis would need to be placed on both psychology and theology rather than neuroscience in such a case. The focus of the research would necessarily diversify, but the project as a whole would not suddenly become incoherent or collapse. Accepting *S* for Christian belief would come closer to striking a control belief than accepting *T* would for science, however it would still not be fatal. A materialistic view of Christianity would be foreign and require a radical revision of many auxiliary hypotheses, but it would be possible to preserve the hard-core as enunciated previously. ### 2.3.3 How deeply ingressed are *S* and *T* in their respective programs? As alluded to in discussing the control beliefs, both *S* and *T* are deeply ingressed in their respective research programs. It seems *T* more so than *S* because of the numerous references to the soul/spirit found throughout the Biblical literature. If *S* were found to be preferred or true over and against *T*, long-held beliefs regarding doctrines such as anthropology, the incarnation, the resurrection, pastoral beliefs, and widely held metaphysical views must be revised. Some Christian thinkers have begun to do just this because of their commitment to *S* or something like *S*. For example, one of the most difficult problems faced by a would-be Christian materialist is the incarnation. Corcoran argues that his proposed constitution view (CV) is actually a better fit to the incarnation than the traditional substance dualist view of classical Christianity.²¹ Corcoran writes: >[T]he incarnate Christ is one person with two natures, a fully divine nature (that of the Second Person of the Trinity) and a fully human nature (that of Jesus of Nazareth). CV divides things where one would expect – between the huan nature and the dvine nature of the single person...the person of Christ is not human; he is divine...But this one person, in the incarnation, had two natures – human and divine...Christ is wholly immaterial in his divine nature and wholly material in his human nature...According to Substance Dualism, Christ is wholly immaterial in his divine nature and partly material and partly immaterial in his human nature...CV far from being unable to accommodate the doctrine of the incarnation, is actually better able to explain the doctrine than is dualism.²² While there are many criticisms of this view, the purpose is to show how deeply ingressed dualism is in Christian theology, that it bumps up against the hard-core of the incarnation itself. It is still salvageable (assuming Corcoran’s position is coherent) but it would take a radical reinterpretation of many passages of scripture. The scientific enterprise, if it were to acquiesce to *T*, too would need significant revisions. If *T* were true, Thomas Nagel argues that, “the mental...cannot be fully explained by physical science,” and “those aspects of our physical constitution that bring with them the mental cannot be fully explained by science either...The possibility opens up a pervasive conception of the natural order very different from materialism – one that makes mind central, rather than a side effect of physical law.”²³ This view would allow teleological reasoning to enter the scientific realm and, as Nagel argues, place physics in the position of dependence on the mental.²⁴ The power of this approach would be to offer a complete explanation that science would be incapable of on its own. If *T* is true, it would not be a science-stopper by any means, but rather provide a broader range of options for explanation. But what of science’s calling card – methodological naturalism? Methodological naturalism is on shaky ground as is, but it certainly would appear that one would be better served by incorporating all true knowledge into an enterprise rather than proscribing certain areas of explanation *a priori*. Admittedly, methodological naturalism would likely be jettisoned if science incorporated *T* into its assumptions; there would no longer be reason to designate teleological reasoning as explanatorily irrelevant. ### 2.3.4 What is the relative degree of support for *S* and *T*? *T* enjoys support within theology from a plethora of Scripture such as the small sample mentioned previously, but also enjoys a degree of philosophical support. Goetz argues that *T* is a “belief [that] is basic in nature” due to the wide prevalence and long history that it has and the arguments of Descartes regarding his self-awareness as a soul.²⁵ Moreland elaborates upon this by providing six additional arguments for dualism. #### The Knowledge Argument. This argues from the existence of non-physical knowledge through a thought experiment involving a blind scientist named Mary, who knows all the physical facts about sight.²⁶ After acquiring all physical knowledge about visual perception she regains her sight and thus gains new, non-physical knowledge once she is able to see herself, namely what it is like to see. This new knowledge is explicitly mental, therefore *T* is supported contra *S*. #### Consciousness and Intentionality. Intentionality is understood as the ‘about-ness’ or ‘of-ness’ of a mental state. Moreland’s argument can be stated as follows: 1. At least some mental states have intentionality. 2. No physical state has intentionality. 3. ∴ at least some mental states are not physical.²⁷ Moreland’s argument shows that the dualist account is capable of explaining features of consciousness that the eliminativist account cannot. #### Unity and the First Person Perspective. A third-person perspective would be sufficient to exhaustively describe the world if materialism were true. However, this third-person description does not exhaustively describe the world because there remains first-person knowledge.²⁸ Moreland takes this subjective, first person view of consciousness to be a key prediction of dualism which would not arise on *S*.²⁹ #### The Modal Argument. A simple thought-experiment about whether or not one could possibly be disembodied shows that one is not simply their brain and body, but something more.³⁰ #### Argument from Free Will, Morality, Responsibility, and Punishment. If one is just a physical system, one does not have free will³¹ to choose, instead one is determined.³² The idea of being a physically determined system neither comports with our regular experience, nor with our moral intuitions. To argue that one ought to do something requires that one is capable of either doing said action or choosing otherwise. On *S* free will evaporates as do morals, thus *T* should be preferred if such free will and morality do exist. #### Sameness of the Self over Time. Physical objects change from moment to moment as parts are removed or replaced not only at a macroscopic level, but also at the atomic level, such that an object at *A* at time *t₀* is not identical to *A* at time *t*. Humans perceive themselves as the same individual as persisting through time despite all manner of physical changes. Therefore, if physical objects do not persist as the same object over time, and yet humans do, then there must be some non-physical substance that humans possess which does endure.³³ Thus we have additional support for *T* over *S*. *S* primarily derives its support from neuroscience, which shows a strong correlation between the physical brain states and consciousness. Corcoran provides two examples in support of *S* from neuroscience, namely a patient whose hippocampus had been destroyed by a virus leaving him unable to generate new memories, and clinical cases of *blindsight*, a condition where blinded patients are still able to identify the direction of light although they cannot see it.³⁴ In both of these cases, Corcoran believes that statements such as T are unnecessary, thus we ought to prefer S because it is capable of explaining the phenomena on its own. Nancy Murphy also finds such neurophysiological findings compelling as “they provide dramatic evidence for physicalism. As neuroscientists associate more and more of the faculties they once attributed to mind or soul with the functioning of specific regions or systems of the brain it becomes more and more appealing to say that it is in fact the brain that performs these functions.”³⁵ These types of phenomena could be multiplied, particularly as neurophysiological evidence accrues which are able to correlate brain activities and locations with personality, memory, perception, and other activities. Despite the mountain of studies showing these correlations, Goetz is quick to point out that correlation does not establish identity. “Two distinct things could be correlated and genuinely remain two distinct things...there could be soul functions and events correlated with brain functions and events.”³⁶ Moreover, Goetz cites C. Stephen Evans who sees these studies as no problem for dualism precisely because, “most dualists have been interactionists [and] eager to maintain that the body (and the wider physical world) can in some way affect the mind...We did not need neurophysiology to come to know that a person whose head is bashed in with a club quickly loses his or her ability to think or have any conscious processes.”³⁷ Rather than providing a new, radical insight – that the mind depends on the brain and body – Evans sees neurophysiology as detailing precisely how the mind depends on the brain and body. As a result, the dualist need not be concerned with the claims to locate certain brain processes or map their physical structure in the brain and is justified in light of the arguments set out by Moreland and others in maintaining *T*. On the other hand, *S* seems to lack the same explanatory power and scope that *T* is capable of providing. ### 2.3.5 Are either *S* or *T* subject to significant internal problems? The primary support for dualists of all stripes, it seems, come from the internal problems of *S*. Consider the eliminativist denial of the existence of mental states such as desires and beliefs.³⁸This strikes most people as absurd because they believe that they have beliefs and experience them regularly. Moreover, a consistent eliminativist approach has a number of absurd conclusions. [*Consider the Free-Thinking Argument Against Naturalism*](http://freethinkingministries.com/the-freethinking-argument-in-a-nutshell/) which argues that the denial of an immaterial soul leads to a denial of free-will and thus rationality and knowledge.³⁹ This position can be summed up nicely in J.B.S. Haldane’s quip, “If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true ... and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms.”⁴⁰ Finally, Victor Reppert outlines six independent arguments against eliminativist materialism which, if any are successful, would make the position incoherent.⁴¹ #### The Argument from Intentionality. This argument hinges upon the incoherence of the idea that one physical state can be about another state. He writes, “eliminative materialists maintain that since intentional states will probably not be found in the course of brain science, it follows that there are no intentional states of the human person” and thus no rationality.⁴² As a result, we can have no reason to accept *S* on *S*, making it self-refuting. #### The Argument from Truth. It is nonsensical to treat one piece of matter as being true with respect to another – that requires a mental capacity.⁴³ As a result, truth becomes conceptually vacuous on *S*, which would be seriously damaging for the scientific project. #### The Argument from Mental Causation. In order for rational inference to be possible, one mental event must be capable of causing a subsequent mental event due to the content of a proposition.⁴⁴ If brain states simply are the neurophysical properties and nothing more, then the propositional content of logically connected statements becomes superfluous, and again, rationality is removed from the scientific program.⁴⁵ #### The Argument from the Psychological Relevance of Logical Laws. Logical laws are control beliefs for science, however Reppert argues that *S* would undercut this central belief because these laws are non-physical as they pertain across possible worlds. They contradict with material ontologies, but moreover, they contradict with materialist modes of knowledge which require a causal-interactionist model for coming to know them.⁴⁶ But, if they are in fact non-physical, then S would seem to make it impossible for us to know the basic laws of logic. #### The Argument from Unity of Consciousness in Rational Inference. Reppert argues that in order for rational inference to take place, there must be a central unity to consciousness in order to evaluate the premises and infer to the conclusion, something a disparate system would be incapable of doing in the way in which we perceive ourselves as doing.⁴⁷ Thus, rationality would require something more than what S would provide. #### Argument from the Reliability of our Cognitive Faculties. This argument follows Plantinga’s [*Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism*](http://amzn.to/2Hpd0KA) by arguing that naturalism would be incapable of creating creatures that are attuned to truth by evolutionary means alone.⁴⁸ If anyone of the preceding arguments are correct, then *S* provides a deep internal conflict with the entire scientific enterprise. Ironically then, it would seem that science ought to reject *S*.⁴⁹ *T*, by contrast seems to lack any deep incoherencies or pose logical problems for Christian theology as a whole. Although Corcoran does not find dualism persuasive, he admits that “dualism can be made to fit the data.”⁵⁰ Further, he asks when presenting evidence for materialism, “is dualism logically incompatible with such empirical discoveries in the neurosciences as the discovery that severe atrophying of the hippocampus results in the near total loss of continuity of of conscious memory? Of course not.”⁵¹ It seems that T is consistent with both science and Christian theology, whereas S conflicts deeply with both. ### 2.3.6 Is an anti-realist interpretation of *S* or *T* possible or desirable? An anti-realist interpretation of *T* would be equivalent to *S* and would require radical re-interpretation of a vast range of scripture. In light of the preceding arguments and the seemingly overwhelming amount of scriptural material in support of *T*, much would be lost in taking an anti-realist position. ### 2.3.7 Can either *S* or *T* be isolated for the time being or is a judgement forced? Both *S* and *T* are deeply embedded in their respective research programs, which would push towards making a judgement on the issue. Yes, both programs may continue without making a judgement, but it seems that they would consistently err if working under the wrong assumption. Consider the consequences if *S* is true and Christian theology continues unabated, more and more faulty works on spiritual development, eschatology, Christology, and other important areas would be produced further undermining the credibility of theology. On the other hand, if *T* is the correct view, then science (broadly defined) would similarly pursue the wrong course which may have dire consequences. Mental ailments would likely increasingly be ascribed to physical issues in the brain when therapy or counselling ought to be preferred. More emphasis would be placed on the hard-sciences to the potential detriment of real, human lives, their souls, and mental health. # 3 Conclusion In light of the preceding discussion, which way ought one turn given *S* and *T* as live options? The internal problems for science with *S* would be sufficient to tip the scales in favour of *T*. With the rapid progress currently enjoyed by new developments in neuroscience, little attention has been paid to the philosophical implications of many findings and statements by practitioners in the field. One would hope that more consideration will be given in the coming years because the problems posed by *S* are indeed severe. Moreover, it seems that science could benefit from *T* by allowing a larger breadth of explanations. This would give a more complete understanding of the natural order, and a more effective science. Science and theology ought to be free to follow the evidence where it leads, whether that evidence arises internally, or from a separate discipline. Doing so will bring a more comprehensive picture of reality and – if the convergence model is correct – a unified view as well. ## Footnotes 1. Take Jerry Coyne for example, he begins chapter three of his recent book Faith vs. Fact with a quote attributed to Robert Green Ingersoll: "There is no harmony between religion and science. When science was a child, religion sought to strangle it in the cradle. Now that science has attained its youth, and superstition is in its dotage, the trembling, palsied wreck says to the athlete, 'Let us be friends.' It reminds me of the bargain the cock wished to make with the horse: “Let us agree not to step on each other’s feet." Coyne continues by defining his term accomodationism as, “claiming that science and religion are not in conflict” as an explicit “solution to another form of cognitive dissonance...that appears when you live in a culture that reveres science but you still cling to pseudoscientific and religious myths.” As a result, various religious people (scientists and otherwise) cope with deep degrees of cognitive dissonance and inconsistency. Jerry Coyne. [*Faith vs. Fact*](https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0143108263/ref=as_li_qf_asin_il_tl?ie=UTF8&tag=datahubbs02-20&creative=9325&linkCode=as2&creativeASIN=0143108263&linkId=ca1ba65e981e0d66c9ca871ead3aa742). New York: Penguin, 2015 p. 97. 2. According to Pew Research, most people believe their personal beliefs are in harmony with scientific findings, although a majority also believe that science and religion in general are in conflict and this number has grown over the past five years. Cary Funk and Becka A. Alper. [*Perception of Conflict Between Science and Religion*](http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/10/PI_2015-10-22_religion-and-science_FINAL.pdf). Accessed 13.12.2016. Pew Research Center. 2015. 3. This is often expressed in such dichotomous terms as faith vs. reason. For a good example of this conflation, see Peter Boghassian. [*A Manual for Creating Atheists*](http://amzn.to/2EzrnOr). Durham, NC: Pitchstone Publishing, 2013. Additionally, this methodological difference remains the primary notion behind Stephen J. Gould’s Non-Overlapping Magesteria (NOMA) which sees science and religion in two independent and hermetically sealed areas of inquiry. "Each domain of inquiry frames its own rules and admissible questions, and sets its own criteria for judgment and resolution. These accepted standards and the procedures developed for debating and resolving legitimate issues define the magesterium - or teaching authority - of any given realm." Stephen J. Gould. [*Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life*](http://amzn.to/2BzUizj). New York: Random House Publishing, 1999 pp. 52-53. 4. On the basis of the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin (BVG) theorem, Alexander Vilenkin has recently written, “We have no viable models of an eternal universe. The BGV theorem gives us reason to believe that such models simply cannot be constructed.” Alexander Vilenkin. “The Beginning of the Universe”. In: [*Inference: International Review of Science*](http://inference-review.com/article/the-beginning-of-the-universe) 1.4 (2015). 5. Garrett J. DeWeese. [*Doing Philosophy as a Christian*](http://amzn.to/2sGot5a). Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2011 p. 291 6. ibid. p. 291 7. ibid p. 292 8. Alan Musgrave and Charles Pidgen. “[Imre Lakatos](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/lakatos/)”. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed 16.12.2016. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016. 9. ibid 10. One might object that this would undermine a second Christian doctrine, namely Biblical inerrency. It seems this is an unnecessary addition to the hard-core as it does not arise in the earliest creeds of Christianity such as 1 Corinthians 15:3-8, the Apostle’s Creed, or Nicene Creed. Additionally, Gary Habermas (Gary R. Habermas and Michael R. Licona. The [*Case for the Resurrection of Jesus*](http://amzn.to/2EAIM9D). Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2004), William Lane Craig (William Lane Craig. [*Reasonable Faith*](http://amzn.to/2sIUAkP). Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway, 2008 pp. 360-399), and Michael Licona (Michael R. Licona. The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2010) have all argued strongly for the truth of Christianity without appeal to inerrency through the minimal facts approach and Licona’s “new historiographical method.” Finally, objecting to re-interpreting the age of the earth in light of scientific evidence on the basis of inerrency presupposes a particular, literalist reading of the Genesis account despite the existence of alternative and well-articulated views of others who claim to uphold inerrency. See Hugh Ross and Gleason L. Archer. “The Day-Age View”. In: The Genesis Debate. Ed. by David G. Hagopian. Mission Viejo, California: CruXpress, 2001 and Lee Irons and Meredith G. Kline. “The Framework View”. In: [*The Genesis Debate*](http://amzn.to/2BAohXK). Ed. by David G. Hagopian. Mission Viejo, California: CruXpress, 2001 for examples. 11. DeWeese, Doing Philosophy as a Christian pp. 292-293 12. William Ramsey. [“Eliminative Materialism”](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/materialism-eliminative). In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed 16.12.2016. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016. There are a diverse number of models currently used in active research, but not all are commensurate and each has had varying levels of success. 13. J.J.C. Smart. [“The Mind/Brain Identity Theory”](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/mind-identity/). In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed 17.12.2016. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2014. 14. There are two views of the Christian soul, dichotomist and trichotomist. The first views Biblical passages which refer to the soul and spirit as referring to the same thing, whereas a trichotomist views such passages as making an important distinction. Either way, they posit an immaterial substance and can both be understood as dualist for the purposes here. 15. Matthew 10:28 16. Luke 8:54-55 17. James 2:26 18. John 19:30 19. Stewart Goetz. “Human Persons are Material and Immaterial (Body and Soul)”. In: [*Debating Christian Theism*](http://amzn.to/2BDEUlk). Ed. by Chad Meister J.P. Moreland and Khaldoun A. Sweis. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 pg. 261 20. ibid. pgs. 261-262 21. The constitution view sees humans as being constituted by but not identical with their bodies (Kevin J. Corcoran. [*Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Soul*](http://amzn.to/2C4tmbY). Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006 pgs. 65-66. 22. Corcoran, [*Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Soul*](http://amzn.to/2C4tmbY) pg. 80 23. Thomas Nagel. [*Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False*](http://amzn.to/2sCinCO). New York: Oxford University Press, 2012 Kindle location 186 24. Ibid. Kindle location 283. Nagel is admittedly short on the details of how this would be cashed out, but offers some type of pan-psychism to account for the irreducible features of consciousness he finds compelling. 25. Goetz, “Human Persons are Material and Immaterial (Body and Soul)” pgs. 263-264 26. J.P. Moreland. [*The Soul: How We Know It’s Real and Why it Matters*](http://amzn.to/2Gp5CgV). Chicago: Moody Publishers, 2014 pgs. 82-86 27. ibid. pgs. 86-87 28. ibid. pgs. 121-122 29. ibid. pg. 77 30. ibid. pg. 124 31. Taken to be libertarian free will. 32. Moreland, The Soul: How We Know It’s Real and Why it Matters pg. 129 33. ibid. pgs. 132-133 34. Kevin J. Corcoran. “Human Persons are Material Only”. In: [*Debating Christian Theism*](http://amzn.to/2BDEUlk). Ed. by Chad Meister J.P. Moreland and Khaldoun A. Sweis. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013 pg. 275 35. Nancey Murphy. “Human Nature: Historical, Scientific, and Religious Issues”. In: [*Whatever Happened to the Soul? Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature*](http://amzn.to/2sB3May). Ed. by Nancey Murphy Warren S. Brown and H. Newton Malony. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998 pg. 13 as quoted in Goetz, “Human Persons are Material and Immaterial (Body and Soul)” pg. 266 36. ibid. pg. 267 37. C. Stephen Evans. “Seperable Souls: Dualism, Selfhood, and the Possibility of Life After Death”. In: Christian Scholars Review 34 (2005), pp. 333–334 as quoted in Goetz, “Human Persons are Material and Immaterial (Body and Soul)” pg. 267 38. Ian Ravenscroft. [“Folk Psychology as a Theory”](https://plato.stanford. edu/entries/folkpsych-theory/#ConsForElim). In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed 17.12.2016. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016. 39. Timothy A. Stratton. “The Freethinking Argument Against Naturalism: An Argument for the Existence of the Soul”. MA thesis. La Mirada, CA: Biola University, 2014 40. J.B.S. Haldane. [*Possible Worlds and Other Essays*](http://amzn.to/2szW00J). London: Chatto & Windus, 1929 pg. 209 41. Victor Reppert. [*C.S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason*](http://amzn.to/2CsdFqZ). Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2003 42. ibid. pgs. 75 43. ibid. pgs. 76-77 44. ibid. pgs. 78-80 45. For a fuller explanation of this line of reasoning, see Alvin Plantinga. “A New Argument Against Materialism”. In: The Evangelical Philosophical Society. Atlanta, GA, 2010. 46. Reppert, [*C.S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason*](http://amzn.to/2CsdFqZ) pgs. 81-82 47. ibid. pgs. 82-84 48. ibid. pgs. 84-85 49. One might wonder why such a potentially dangerous commitment such as S would be seriously proposed and considered. The words of Richard Lewontin (Richard C. Lewontin. [“Billions and Billions of Demons”](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1997/01/09/billions-and-billions-of-demons/). In: The New York Review of Books. Vol. 44. 1. Accessed 18.12.2016. New York Books, 1997) may help shed some light on this front: Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. 50. Corcoran, “Human Persons are Material Only” pg. 274 51. ibid. pg. 275